dopaminergic activating structures of the brain stem and diencephalon, formerly known as the reticulo-thalamic activating system (RTAS). 2 That influence occurs onto the activity of thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical circuits. This persistent activation sets and maintains the necessary conditions for the content of consciousness to emerge. 3 The great majority of the influence of RTAS on cortical activity is relayed through the thalamus. The activity of the RTAS is, in turn, influenced by sensory afferents and controls motor efferents.
The hypothesis of cerebral correlates of consciousness, that is, cerebral systems whose activity allows the emergence of mental content, is largely accepted. Those systems are even more complex than those sustaining vigilance and are still not completely understood. The current prevailing theory is the global workspace theory 4, 5 : synchronized specialized brain regions would share their information into a common workspace, which is a complex network of cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical functional connections. Other cerebral systems would permit those synchronized neural networks to put their own elements of the mental content forward, in the front of the scene of consciousness. The mental content would, therefore, be the result of converging information from lower order functional neural assemblies toward higher order assemblies. The regulating neural systems could be the system responsible for selective attention, which involves afferences from the thalamus and the limbic system and the executive voluntary system of the frontal cortex. Indeed, it has been postulated that there is a particular neural network whose activity predominates during the waking conscious resting state and decreases when one performs a demanding externally cued task. 6 Several cortical regions have been proposed to be involved in this default mode network, 7, 8 including posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex, and bilateral frontoparietal associative and temporo-parietal junction areas. 9 The synchronized functional connectivity in the default mode network would sustain the mental content at rest, and, when required, a switch in the activity between the default mode network and other networks involved in specific cognitive functions, such as attention demanding tasks, would occur. 7, 10 Moreover, fluctuations in the activity of the default mode network with time seem to determine the extent to which an external low intensity stimulus can be consciously perceived.
(i) global brain function, (ii) regional brain function, (iii) changes in functional connectivity, and (iv) primary versus associative cortical activation in response to external stimulation. ' 
Altered Conscious States
Three main types of altered states of consciousness can be defined: physiologically, pharmacologically, and pathologically altered conscious states. Normal sleep, encompassing light (stage II) and deep (stage III and IV) slow wave sleep stages, and dreaming [mostly occurring during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep] can be considered as the main physiologically altered conscious states. Pharmacologically induced unconscious states are commonly named deep sedation or general anesthesia. Sedative anesthetic agents can be separated into 3 main categories: the classic anesthetic agents, the dissociative anesthetic agents, and the minimally sedative agents. Examples of classic anesthetic agents are benzodiazepines, barbiturates, propofol, and halogenated compounds such as desflurane or sevoflurane. They are able to induce graded states of sedation and combine alterations of wakefulness and awareness. Dissociative anesthetic agents, such as ketamine or nitrous oxide, are able to blunt out conscious processes while maintaining signs of wakefulness. Finally, minimally sedative agents induce graded alterations of wakefulness while preserving several cognitive brain functions. Their main representatives are the a2-adrenergic agonists, such as clonidine or dexmedetomidine. 12 The last category of altered states of consciousness refers to pathologic altered conscious states, which are the result of severe brain insults of various origins, and encompass comatose, vegetative, and minimally conscious states. 13 Comatose patients have no signs of vigilance or awareness, whereas patients in the vegetative state look awake, meaning that their eyes are open, but are not aware of their environment, only exhibiting reflex behavior. Minimally conscious patients show (minimal) signs of voluntary behavior, but are not able to show interactive communication. 14 As illustrated above, the different types of altered states of consciousness associate varying combinations in the alteration of vigilance or awareness. Studying global, regional, and cerebral connectivity changes between conscious and unconscious states in the presence or absence of external stimulation is, therefore, of particular interest for the quest for the neural correlates of consciousness. This will be detailed hereafter.
'

Consciousness and Global Decreases in Cerebral Metabolism
Is awareness lost when overall cortical activity falls bellow a certain threshold? Using fluorine-18-labeled deoxyglucose positron emission tomography (PET), it was shown that in slow wave sleep, 15 ,16 overall brain metabolism decreases to approximately 60% of normal waking values, whereas in REM sleep, metabolism returns to nearly normal waking values. 17 When different anesthetics, such as propofol, 18 halothane, 19 or isoflurane, 20 are titrated to the point of unresponsiveness, global cerebral metabolism decreases to about 40% to 50% of normal values. In propofol anesthesia, global decreases in brain metabolism have been reported down to 28% of normal waking values. 18 In pathologic coma (of either traumatic or hypoxic origin), gray matter metabolism is, on average, 50% to 70% of normal values. [21] [22] [23] [24] Patients who ''awaken'' from coma to a vegetative state, classically show a massive cerebral metabolic decrease to about 40% of normal values (Fig. 1) . 22, [25] [26] [27] [28] However, in some patients who recovered from the vegetative state, global metabolic rates for glucose metabolism did not show substantial changes. 29 Moreover, some awake healthy volunteers have global brain metabolism values comparable with those observed in unconscious states (Laureys et al, unpublished) . Inversely, some rare, but well documented, vegetative patients have shown close to normal global cortical metabolism. 30 Hence, the relationship between global levels of brain function and the presence or absence of awareness is not absolute. It seems that some areas in the brain are more important than others for its emergence. Have these ''awareness regions'' been identified? ' Regional Changes in Brain Activity: ''Consciousness Networks'' Voxel-based statistical analyses have identified brain regions showing metabolic decreases when unconscious states were contrasted to conscious waking states. During deep sleep (slow wave stage III to IV), cerebral deactivations have been shown in a wide fronto-parietal network encompassing the polymodal associative cortices: bilateral lateral frontal regions, parieto-temporal and posterior parietal areas, mesiofrontal, posterior cingulate, and precuneal cortices-by contrast, primary sensory cortices are not deactivated. 15, [31] [32] [33] These frontoparietal associative cortical areas were shown to be the most active ''by default'' in resting nonstimulated waking conditions 10, 34 and are known to be important in various functions that are necessary for consciousness, such as attention, memory, and language. 4 This fronto-parietal network also decreases its activity during general anesthesia using not only intravenous administration of propofol 35, 36 but also during halothane inhalation. 19 Similarly, in pathologic coma 37 and in the vegetative state of varying etiology, these same associative cortices have been shown to be dysfunctional (Fig. 2) . 28 Also, in other dissociated states between vigilance and awareness the frontoparietal ''awareness'' network has been shown to decrease its activity. 1 Indeed, in some cases of epilepsy and parasomnia, patients also are seemingly ''wakeful'' and may show automatic albeit nonpurposeful behavior. Absence seizures, for example, present as brief episodes of staring and unresponsiveness-often accompanied by eye blinking and lip smacking. Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have shown widespread deactivations in fronto-parietal associative cortices during these absence seizures. [38] [39] [40] Temporal lobe seizures also may impair consciousness (they are then classified ''complex partial,'' whereas if they terminate without impaired consciousness they are called ''simple partial''). Loss of responsiveness in complex partial seizures usually persists for up to several minutes and patients may show oral and manual automatisms (eg, picking, fumbling, and cycling). Contrasting ictal with interictal conditions again revealed ''marked bilateral deactivation in frontal and parietal association cortex. In contrast, temporal lobe seizures in which consciousness was spared were not accompanied by these widespread changes.'' 41 Finally, in somnambulism (a parasomnia occurring during deep sleep), patients show transient nonresponsiveness with partially preserved arousal and semipurposeful behavior such as ambulation. In 1 patient, the only one studied so far, ''large areas of frontal and parietal association cortices remained deactivated during sleepwalking.'' 42 Hence, the neuronal aggregates involved in awareness are not evenly distributed throughout the brain, but are comprised of key components we refer to as the fronto-parietal network correlate of awareness. 43 A critical node in this network is the posteromedial area encompassing the poster cingulate and adjacent precuneal cortices.
'
The Posteromedial Cortical ''Consciousness Switch''
A few patients could be studied by PET during the vegetative state and after recovery of consciousness. In these patients, it could be shown that the brain areas where metabolism was most impaired during unconsciousness and returned to near-normal values after recovery were located in the posteromedial cortex (area 7 and 31) encompassing the precuneus and adjacent posterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 3, left  panel) . 29 , 44 Maquet et al 15, 32 showed that this area progressively decreased its activity during non-REM sleep-as illustrated in a recent meta-analysis of 207 PET scans obtained during wakefulness and stage II, III/IV, and REM sleep and in 22 young, healthy volunteers (Fig. 3,  upper right graph) . 45 This brain area is also the common cortical site of action of several anesthetics such as the inhalational agent sevoflurane 46 and the intravenous anesthetic agent propofol. 35, 46 A reanalysis of PET data obtained by Bonhomme et al 47 in 8 healthy volunteers receiving propofol showed a progressive decrease in precuneal and posterior cingulate cortical activity with the deepening of sedation and a profound reduction during loss of consciousness, which completely restored upon return of consciousness (Fig. 3, lower right graph) . 45 Additionally, studies with the a2-adrenoreceptor agonist clonidine 12 have shown a regional suppression effect involving the posteromedial cortex at doses that cause heavy sedation or at doses that are just beyond a loss of consciousness end point. Most recently, the effects of the inert noble gas xenon at doses that maintained loss of consciousness were also shown to encompass the posterior cingulate cortex. 50 Alkire et al have argued that the most consistent effects produced by most, if not all, anesthetic agents involve thalamic metabolism or blood flow and cortico-thalamo-cortical connectivity, suggesting the possibility that the thalamus may serve as a consciousness switch. 51, 52 The challenge is to find out whether anesthetics produce unconsciousness when they affect a particular set of cortical areas, as opposed to by producing a widespread deactivation of corticothalamic circuits. Recently, thalamic activity was recorded using depth electrodes in a patient undergoing anesthesia for the implant of a deep brain stimulator. 53 When the patient lost consciousness (using either propofol or sevoflurane), the cortical electrical activity changed dramatically, but there was little change in the thalamus, implying that for loss of consciousness, the cortical deactivation seems more important than the thalamic deactivation. The precuneal and posterior cingulate cortices also shown the highest energy consumption in normal conscious waking 42 and decrease their activity in other altered states of consciousness such as the hypnotic state, 54, 55 dementia, 56,57 and Wernicke-Korsakoff or postanoxic amnesia. 58 We, hence, suggested that this richly connected 59 multimodal associative area has a critical role 49 The right lower graph shows regional cerebral blood flow changes in precuneal and posterior cingulate cortex during waking before anesthesia (level 0), mild sedation (clear response to commands, slightly drowsy; level 1), moderate sedation (slowed response to commands, slurred speech; level 2), unconsciousness (no response to command; level 3), and recovery of consciousness (response to command; level R) (mean values and 95% confidence interval). Note the progressive decrease in activity with deepening of propofol-induced sedation, the profound reduction during loss of consciousness, and finally restoration of function paralleled by the return of consciousness. in the neural network subserving human awareness. 4 Current analyzing techniques now also permit to assess awareness-related changes in functional integration, that is, measuring differences in functional cerebral connectivity between unconscious and conscious states. ' 
Functional Connectivity Changes in Unconsciousness
Consciousness seems not exclusively related to the activity in the fronto-parietal network but, as importantly, to the functional connectivity within this network and with the thalami. Using psychophysiologic interaction analyses, 60 ''awareness-related'' changes in functional integration can be identified, that is measuring differences in functional cerebral connectivity between unconscious and conscious states.
Complementary to the concept of functional segregation as a principle of organization in the human brain, more recent approaches have focused on the integration of functionally segregated areas through characterizing neurophysiologic activations in terms of distributed changes (eg, functional connectivity). 61 The concepts of functional connectivity were developed in the analysis of separable spike trains obtained from multiunit electrode recordings. However, the neurophysiologic measurements obtained from functional neuroimaging are of a very different timescale (seconds vs. milliseconds) and nature (hemodynamic or metabolic vs. spike trains) than those obtained from electrophysiologic studies. Put simply, these statistical analyses identify brain regions that show condition-dependent differences in modulation with another (chosen) area. It is important to stress that one cannot guarantee either that these connections are direct (ie, they may be mediated through other areas) or that the 2 regions can have a common input (a third area, which shows context-sensitive responses, may be providing input to the 2 areas implicated in the psychophysiologic interaction).
Long-range cortico-cortical (between latero-frontal and posteromedial cortices) 28, 62 and cortico-thalamo-cortical 63 (between nonspecific thalamic intralaminar nuclei and posteromedial cortices) ''functional disconnections'' have been identified in the vegetative state. Schiff et al 64 recently showed that by applying deep brain stimulation in these intralaminar thalamic nuclei, cognitive function was enhanced in a posttraumatic minimally conscious patient. Moreover, recovery from the vegetative state was shown to be paralleled by a functional restoration of the fronto-parietal network 29 and part of its cortico-thalamo-cortical connections. 62 Comparable changes in long-range cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamo-cortical functional connectivity have been shown by Alkire et al during loss of consciousness in general anesthesia 52, 65 (also 
Cerebral Activation During External Stimulation in Unconscious States
Functional neuroimaging data obtained in sleep, 66 general anesthesia, 47, [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] and the vegetative state [74] [75] [76] [77] have shown that external auditory or somatosensory stimulation may still activate primary ''low level'' cortices, but classically fail to reach ''higher order'' associative areas. In pharmacologically induced loss of consciousness using propofol [67] [68] [69] or sevoflurane, 70 the cortical activation induced by simple auditory stimuli, such as sounds or words, is largely decreased in extent and intensity [67] [68] [69] [70] as compared with conscious waking conditions or fails to lead to cortical activation whatsoever (Fig. 4,  upper panel) . 69 When assessing more complex aspects of language comprehension and semantics, cortical processing seems absent during anesthesia. 67 A recent study by Davis et al 71 similarly suggested that ''higher-level'' semantic and mnemonic processes are impaired at relatively low levels of sedation, whereas perceptual processing of speech may remain resilient even during deep sedation. Studies using somatosensory stimulation during propofol 47 or isoflurane 72 -induced loss of consciousness have shown loss of cortical activation. However, high intensity stimuli, such as painful heat 73 or supramaximal electrical shocks, 72 have been shown to still activate the gray matter during general anesthesia, albeit largely decreased in extent and intensity as compared with conscious waking conditions ( Table 1) .
Similarly in the vegetative state, studies using noxious high-intensity electrical stimulation (experienced as painful in controls) showed robust activation in brainstem, thalamus, and primary somatosensory cortex, but not in hierarchically higher-order areas of the pain matrix (ie, secondary somatosensory, insular, posterior parietal, and anterior cingulate cortices). 76 Moreover, the activated primary somatosensory cortex was isolated and dissociated from the fronto-parietal network, thought to be required for conscious perception. Auditory stimulation in unambiguously vegetative patients also activated primary auditory cortices, but not higher-order multimodal areas from which they were shown to be disconnected. 75, 77 The activation in primary cortices in unconscious states confirms Crick and Koch's 78 early hypothesis (on the basis of visual perception and monkey histologic connectivity) that neural activity in primary cortices is necessary, but not sufficient, for awareness (Fig. 4, lower panel) . ' 
Conclusions
Although philosophers have for centuries pondered upon the relation between mind and brain, neuroscientists have only recently been able to explore the connection analytically. Recent advances in technology and emerging functional neuroimaging modalities finally permit us to peer inside the black box. As demonstrated in the studies reviewed above in physiologic (sleep), pharmacologic (general anesthesia), and pathologic (coma and the vegetative state) altered states of consciousness, recent scientific evidence is providing insight on how, through the interactions among the brain's 100 billion neurons, connected by trillions of synapses, our conscious experience of the world and of ourselves emerges. 
